Property taxes and dynamic efficiency: A correction  by Homburg, Stefan
Economics Letters 123 (2014) 327–328Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Property taxes and dynamic efficiency: A correction
Stefan Homburg
Institute of Public Economics, Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany
h i g h l i g h t s
• Generally, land rules out overaccumulation in an OLG model.
• Following Kim and Lee (1997), a property case may invalidate this result.
• Whereas taxes on capital gains and taxes on rent preserve dynamic efficiency.
• We show that these statements are all unwarranted.
• As long as the rent is not completely taxed away, overaccumulation is ruled out.
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a b s t r a c t
According to Kim and Lee (1997), property taxes as opposed to capital gain taxes and taxes on rent endan-
ger dynamic efficiency. The present paper shows that the choice of the tax base is immaterial.What counts
is whether the taxes eliminate the after-tax rent. Empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).l1. Introduction
Diamond (1965) was the first to show that a competitive equi-
librium in an overlapping generations (OLG) model with produc-
tion may be dynamically inefficient in the sense that the economy
could consume more in some periods without consuming less
otherwise. This type of inefficiency is also referred to as over-
accumulation. According to a now standard argument, however,
overaccumulation cannot occur if one puts the land as a factor of
production into the Diamond model; see Homburg (1991) or Rhee
(1991). Provided that the land income share is uniformly positive,
the compound interest rate will exceed the compound growth rate
in the limit which implies dynamic efficiency. This result is triv-
ial for stationary or steady states but extends to arbitrary growth
paths with changing factor proportions and fluctuating prices.
E-mail address: homburg@fiwi.uni-hannover.de.
URL: http://www.fiwi.uni-hannover.de.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.013
0165-1765/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access artic
0/).Introducing land in a sense opens a newmarket in the OLG model,
and as people start trading in that market, overaccumulation is
ruled out.
Pointing to taxation, Kim and Lee (1997) have challenged this
result. These authors assert: first, taxes on capital gains and taxes
on rental incomes preserve dynamic efficiency. Second, this is not
true for a property tax levied on land values. The purpose of this
note is to show that both the statements are unwarranted.
In order to do so it will not be necessary to reproduce the entire
model. It suffices to copy the author’s central equation
qt+1 + ρt+1
qt
= 1+ rt+1 − δ (1)
which is quite intuitive: the left-hand side represents the return
on land bought at price qt in some period t and sold at price qt+1
thereafter. The land yields a rent ρt+1 which equals its marginal
productivity. The right-hand side represents the return on capital.
It equals one plus interest rt+1 minus depreciation δ, where the in-
terest rate coincides with the marginal productivity of capital. In
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by the authors are maintained; in particular, the marginal produc-
tivities are strictly positive.
2. Taxation in an economy with land
In footnote 6, Kim and Lee (1997: 171) state that capital gain
taxes and taxes on rent do not impair dynamic efficiency. The first
step is to show that this assertion is generally incorrect. In what
follows a tax is referred to as confiscatory if it takes away the entire
land rent; otherwise the tax is non-confiscatory. Rewriting (1) as
qt+1 − qt
qt
+ ρt+1
qt
= rt+1 − δ (2)
and multiplying this equation by 1 − τ , where τ represents the
tax rate, it is obvious that a comprehensive income tax imposed on
the sum of capital gains (qt+1 − qt)/qt , land rents ρt+1/qt , and in-
terest income rt+1 − δ leaves the arbitrage condition unaffected,
provided that the tax is non-confiscatory. A confiscatory income
tax (τ = 1) destroys the markets for land and capital in the same
way as a confiscatory tax on earningswould destroy the labormar-
ket; it also invalidates the proof of dynamic efficiency. In order to
avoid a possible misconception, stating that a non-confiscatory tax
leaves the arbitrage condition unaffected does not mean that the
involved variables remain unchanged—they will generally adjust.
But the arbitrage condition itself holds true, and this suffices to de-
duce dynamic efficiency along the well-known route.
A tax on rent, as analyzed by Feldstein (1977), will also leave
the arbitrage condition intact if and only if it is non-confiscatory.
To see this one only has to replace the rent ρt+1 by the after-tax
rent ρt+1 − τρt+1 in Eq. (1). Any tax rate below one hundred per-
cent preserves the sign of the after-tax rent and validates the effi-
ciency proof. Remembering that land opens a new market in the
OLG model, a confiscatory tax on rent would close this market,
making land as intrinsically worthless as Samuelson’s (1958) bub-
bly money. Inefficiency may then result.
The property tax studied by Kim and Lee remains to be consid-
ered. This tax is imposed in period t+1 on the land value in period
t; it diminishes the after-tax rent to ρt+1 − τqt . If the property tax
is non-confiscatory, the resulting equilibrium will be dynamicallyefficient, as argued in the preceding paragraph. However, if the
property tax were confiscatory and eliminated the after-tax rent,
land would become intrinsically worthless in the same manner as
under a confiscatory tax on rent.
3. Conclusion
Regarding dynamic efficiency, there is no difference at all be-
tween a property tax on the one hand and a comprehensive income
tax or a tax on rent on the other hand. All these taxes preserve
dynamic efficiency if they are non-confiscatory. Conversely, if a
government eliminated after-tax rents, the economy would be-
come essentially an economywithout land, since the land does not
preclude overaccumulation via a technological channel but only
through an arbitrage condition based on a functioning landmarket.
The conclusions of Kim and Lee (1997) are unwarranted and result
from an implicit assumption that income and rent taxes were non-
confiscatory whereas the property tax could be confiscatory.
In reality, many countries levy property taxes indeed. To keep
the land markets intact, which play an important allocative role at
the micro-level, tax burdens are adjusted so as to ensure strictly
positive after-tax rents. In accordance with this finding, modern
national accounts show tremendous land values—the value of land
being of the same order of magnitude as the value of reproducible
capital; see OECD (2014). Therefore, real land markets can operate
in a fashion that preserves dynamic efficiency.
References
Diamond, P.A., 1965. National debt in a neoclassical growthmodel. Amer. Econ. Rev.
55, 1126–1150.
Feldstein, M., 1977. The surprising incidence of a tax on pure rent: a new answer to
an old question. J. Political Econ. 85, 349–360.
Homburg, S., 1991. Interest and growth in an economywith land. Canad. J. Econom.
24, 450–459.
Kim, K.-S., Lee, J., 1997. Reexamination of dynamic efficiency with taxation on land.
Econom. Lett. 57, 169–175.
OECD, 2014. National accounts—balance sheets for non-financial assets (Table 9B).
Available electronically at: stats.oecd.org.
Rhee, C., 1991. Dynamic inefficiency in an economy with land. Rev. Econom. Stud.
58, 791–797.
Samuelson, P.A., 1958. An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or
without the social contrivance of money. J. Political Econ. 66, 467–482.
